After a couple month hiatus Bryant is blogging again. He has a few new posts on plurarlism but this one caught my attention. He is concerned that pluralism has lapsed into cultural relativism, where there is no way to ascertain ‘truth’ because all views are ok. He even accuses Latour of this. And as realists we need to say what is right and wrong. There is a Real beyond any particular point of view (aka perspectivism). (I’m reminded of Harris in this recent video and commentary.)
I still think that some form of developmental psychology would help him to distinguish better views. We could still have a plurality of different views at a similar level, or different peaks in Harris’s terms, all of which would be more based on the Real than less evolved views. And still just be contingent, not final. In Bryant’s own terms, it’s not just balancing the different domains of the Real, Symbolic and the Imaginary, but levels within each of those domains. He does talk about the mereology of assemblages in other contexts so it would help if he applied that to psychological levels.
Although his point is accurate, in that some make claims from one domain about another domain that just aren’t true. In kennilingus, they make a category error based on (con)fusing the value spheres in Habermasian terms. While there are areas of overlaps between the domains, and they can inform each other, they nonetheless have their own set of validity claims.
Open Integral 
The debate about ontology has been really interesting because it’s clear that there are a number of people that are deeply confused as to what ontology is (not a surprise given that most of the participants haven’t been trained as philosophers). Ontology is about what is and what is not, what is real and what is not real. It is not about what people believe to be real. It is not about how people perceive the world. It is not about how people conceptualize the world. It is about what is.
Many of the participants in the discussion have confused people’s worldivews with ontology. The realist is well aware that there are a variety of different worldviews, that different people perceive the world differently, and that animals experience the world differently. However, the mere fact that a person believes that something exists does not establish that it does exist.
Throughout the discussion it’s also clear that a number of people claiming to be ontological pluralists are not, in fact, ontological pluralists. One of the best examples of this was Matthew Segull. He said that he does in fact believe in demonic possession and spirits but that these spirits are really just gran mal seizures. Here Matthew is trying to be charitable to the believer: “What I call gran mal seizures the believer calls demonic possession.” Of course, this is the last sort of support the believer would want. When the believer says demonic possession exists, he really means demons. In this moment, Matt reveals himself as a naturalist, not an ontological pluralist. Also, given that concepts are defined by their inferential use, whether or not these phenomena are demonic possessions or seizures makes a real difference. If the former an exorcism is in order, while in the latter case some sort of medication is called for.
Your suggestion that I need to consult developmental psychology is irrelevant to this whole discussion. First, I actually have a fairly extensive background in developmental psychology. Second, the issue is not whether or not I am aware that a variety of different perspectives exist. Perhaps you’ve missed it, but I’ve written a great deal on second-order observation and the umwelten theory of Jakob von Uexkull. These are both accounts of perspectives and the existence of multiple perspectives. However, these are not ontological issues, but rather epistemological issues. Recognizing that there are a variety of perspectives– who doesn’t recognize this? –is distinct from the ontological issue of what is and what is not.
I am well aware of your writing on second-order observation, and the difference between epistemology and ontology. My point was that there are better epistemologies that take into account the Real and things like second-order observation. And therefore such epistemologies, taking account of ontology, are more accurate and therefore not the type of culturally relative epistemologies against which you rail.
I’m not sure what you’re referring to here. As I said, I have a strong background in developmental psychology. Developmental psychology doesn’t change what the issue is here and is a matter distinct from these ontological issues. You might get a sense of what this discussion is all about if you look at the discussion over at David Roden’s blog, Enemy Industry.