I’m having a discussion with a Dzogchen practitioner and scholar about the nature of rigpa, which he says is not metaphysical yet it is still unconditioned. I brought up the rangtong-shentong debate (see Jackson below), because it seems that Dzogchen is still retaining the notion of an “unconditioned†state that is not the same as the “conditional,†conventional reality. I.e., the dichotomy of the two truths instead of their identity. Even the wikipedia entry suggests a relation of Dzogchen rigpa to shentong. Said practitioner quoted the Dalai Lama (below) as qualifying rigpa as avoiding the pitfalls of shentong and therefore valid. Yet when I read Batchelor on emptiness and the two truths (also below) I cannot reconcile how Dzogchen rigpa stays within the conditioned, codependent origination, yet is “outside†it in some “unconditioned†state. Any help?
From Roger Jackson’s review of The Great Debate on Emptiness:
Other-emptiness was declared to be the heart of a “Great Madhyamaka†philosophical system rooted in India and superior to the “self-emptiness†(rangtong) view of the Prasangika school regarded by Gelukpas (and others) as the acme of Buddhist thought. Although it originated with the Jonangpas, the otheremptiness view found adherents over the years within the other principal lineages of Tibet: the Nyingma, the Kagyu, and to a lesser extent, the Sakya. It is taught by certain masters of those traditions to this day.
The conflict between Rangtongpas and Shentongpas (as I will denote them) is perhaps the most significant philosophical debate in Tibetan history. The ground on which it was contested includes arguments about the Buddha’s intent in teaching emptiness in multiple ways, the significance of discourse about buddhanature (or the “matrix-of-one-gone-thus,†as Hopkins translates it)1 and dharmakaya, the parameters of the two truths, and the sort of negation that emptiness is. To its participants, though, the debate is not mere scholastic speculation about how many nothings can fit on the non-head of a non-pin. Rather, it impinges directly on the great question of spiritual freedom: for Mahayana Buddhists, enlightenment is contingent on a direct realization of emptiness, and emptiness cannot be directly realized if one’s philosophical understanding of it is incorrect. Thus, the stakes in the debate could not be higher.
From the wikipedia entry on Shentong.
Shentong (also, zhentong; Tibetan: གཞེན་སྟོང་; Wylie: gzhen-stong), also sometimes called â€Yogacara Madhyamaka,†is a philosophical sub-school found in Tibetan Buddhism whose followers hold that the nature of mind is “empty of other†(i.e., empty of all qualities other than an inherent, ineffable nature), in contrast to the “Rangtong†view of the followers of Prasangika Madhyamaka, who hold that all phenomena are unequivocally empty of self-nature, without positing anything beyond that. According to Shentongpas, the emptiness of ultimate reality should not be characterized in the same way as the emptiness of apparent phenomena.
When speaking of the emptiness of mind’s ultimate nature, Shentongpas often use terms such as “luminous clarity,†“luminous awareness,†“the clear light nature of mind,†and so forth to characterize their experiences. Such language is often employed in Dzogchen expositions as well.
Stephen Batchelor on emptiness:
Emptiness†is a confusing term. Although used as an abstract noun, it does not in any way denote an abstract thing or state. It is not something we “realize†in a moment of mystical insight that “breaks through†to a transcendent reality concealed behind yet mysteriously underpinning the empirical world. Nor do things “arise†from emptiness and “dissolve†back into it as though it were some kind of formless, cosmic stuff. These are just some of the ways emptiness has been appropriated as a metaphor of metaphysical and religious consolation.
Emptiness is a starkly unappetizing term used to under-cut yearnings for such consolation. Yet ironically it has been called into the service of such longings. Shunyata (emptiness) is rendered into English as “the Void†by translators who overlook the fact that the term is neither prefixed by a definite article (“theâ€) nor exalted with a capital letter, both of which are absent in classical Asian languages. From here it is only a hop, skip, and a jump to equating emptiness with such metaphysical notions as “the Absolute,†“the Truth,†or even “God.†The notion of emptiness falls prey to the very habit of mind it was intended to undermine.
Stephen Batchelor on the two truths (one might argue that Nagarjuna was trying to return an understanding of the two truths to the Buddha’s original meaning.):
“Very often,†says Maurice Walshe in the introduction to his translation of the Long Discourses of the Buddha (Digha Nikaya), “the Buddha talks in the Suttas in terms of conventional or relative truth (sammuti-sacca), according to which people and things exist just as they appear to the naïve understanding. Elsewhere, however, when addressing and audience capable of appreciating his meaning, he speaks in terms of ultimate truth (paramattha-sacca).â€
This passage confirms a view familiar to all Buddhists, no matter what school to which they belong. It is technically known as the doctrine of the Two Truths, according to which reality is divided into two “levelsâ€: the conventional and the ultimate, the relative and the absolute – or, as I translated it somewhere – the partial and the sublime.
It might come as a surprise, therefore – particularly after having just read the words of an eminent translator of the Buddha’s word – to learn that nowhere among the discourses (sutta) in the Pali canon does the Buddha use such terms. This famous distinction between “relative†and “absolute†truth is entirely alien to these early texts. One can certainly interpret his teaching through the lens of such an idea (which, if you read the passage carefully, is what Maurice Walshe does) but bear in mind that the distinction itself is one the Buddha never employed..
The notion of Two Truths goes entirely against the grain of what the Buddha taught. Siddhattha Gotama’s teaching is not founded on absolutes of any kind. He avoids the deeply ingrained assumption of much religious thought that reality is somehow split down the middle (God and Creation / Brahman and Maya / Nirvana and Samsara / Emptiness and Form). Ironically, of course, such divisions are blatantly dualistic – a position most Buddhists are supposed to be at pains to avoid.
In one of the most succinct accounts of his enlightenment, the Buddha speaks of awakening to “dependent origination,†a truth that is “hard to see†since it “goes against the worldly stream.†(Ariyapariyesana Sutta, Majjhima Nikaya 26, section 19). In modern parlance, his insight was counterintuitive. Why? because it went against two “streamsâ€: our instinctive mental habit to split reality into two, and the outward expression of that habit in religious doctrines such as the Two Truths. The Buddha awakened to a glittering plurality of endlessly arising and vanishing phenomena. No God created it; no Mind underpins it; no Unconditioned lies somewhere outside it. Ethics, meditation and wisdom are not founded on some absolute truth, but grow out of a careful examination of what causes suffering and what brings it to an end. Enlightenment, for the Buddha, entailed simply paying attention to the phenomenal flux of your own empirical experience.
The doctrine of the Two Truths seems to have emerged fairly soon after the Buddha’s death. It is not a later Mahayana idea; for it was already taken for granted in the early Abhidhamma. I suspect that it was the first step in the progressive brahminization of Buddhism in India. The Two Truth doctrine is strikingly reminiscent of the Upanishadic teaching that the world of appearances is an illusion (maya) that separates us from the transcendent, absolute reality of God (brahman). But that, of course, was the worldview the Buddha sought to abandon. He wanted to replace it with another way of seeing things altogether: the radical contingency of all existence, devoid of any intrinsic self-essence or God.
Dalai Lama on shentong & dzogchen:
Question: Certain Nyingma masters have expounded shentong- emptiness of other-as the view of Dzogchen. Do you agree with them? Why is shentong such a controversial view among Tibetan Buddhist philosophers?
HHDL: If we read the writings of the great scholar Mipham, especially his commentary on the Sublime Continuum, we find that he explicitly mentions the importance of understanding the Dzogchen view, in which one is able to combine the teachings of emptiness, as expounded in the wisdom sütras of the second turning of the wheel of Dharma, with the sütras belonging to the third turning of the wheel of Dharma, particularly the Essence of Buddhahood Sutra. The understanding developed through a combination of the views expounded in both turnings of the wheel of Dharma will enable us to appreciate what in Dzogchen terminology are called: primordial purity, which is the main subject matter of the second turning, and spontaneous presence, which is the main subject matter of the third turning of the wheel of Dharma.
However, this does not mean that the emptiness spoken of in the second turning, that is in the wisdom sütras, is exactly the same as what in Dzogchen terminology is called primordial purity But one thing which is clear is that without an understanding of emptiness as expounded in the wisdom sutras, and without taking that understanding as a basis, there is no way that you can understand primordial purity in the context of Dzogchen.
As for the question of whether spontaneous presence in Dzogchen is synonymous with what is called the tathagatagarbha- the essence of buddhahood or innate mind of clear light-in the third turning of the wheel of Dharma, especially in the Essence of Buddhahood Sutra, there do seem to be divergent views on that, even among Nyingma meditators and scholars.
One view is that, although there is a difference, the eventual reference for the innate mind of clear light spoken of in Maitreya’s Sublime Continuum or the Essence of Buddhahood Sütra is definitely rigpa, or the spontaneous presence that is spoken of in Dzogchen. But that does not mean that the explicit mention of the two terms refers to the same thing. An example here is that in Yoga Tantra, especially in the tantra of Vairocanãbhisarnbodhi, there is a mention of the rainbow body. Now although we cannot say that this rainbow body is totally synonymous with what is spoken of as the illusory body in Highest Yoga Tantra, yet eventually that reference to the rainbow body, if understood at its deepest level, will come down to the illusory body.
As I explained earlier, in the writings of the Nyingma masters Longchen Rabjam, the omniscient Jikmé Lingpa, and Mipham, there may be mention of the term ‘emptiness of other’, but here the reference is mainly to the fundamental innate mind, that is, to rigpa. This innate mind is ‘empty of other’ in that it is devoid of circumstantial conceptual thought processes. Therefore these types of emptiness of other are totally different from the emptiness of other which was refuted by many Tibetan masters in the past.
There is a tradition of making a distinction between two different perspectives on the nature of emptiness: one is when emptiness is presented within a philosophical analysis of the ultimate reality of things, in which case it ought to be understood in terms of a non-affirming negative phenomena. On the other hand, when it is discussed from the point of view of experience, it should be understood more in terms of an affirming negation.
I think the reason for this statement is that when setting out your philosophical position and view of emptiness, you have to do so while taking into account the common viewpoints of sutra and tantra on the teaching of emptiness. But when speaking from an experiential point of view, you do so more from your understanding of emptiness in terms of the perspective of Highest Yoga Tantra.
Open Integral 
Kela at Lightmind Forum http://www.lightgate.net/boards/viewtopic.php?start=0&t=5982&topic_view=threads
But does this mean that everything is empty? The Yogachara could not countenance this idea. Something remains in emptiness, and this something, for the Yogachara, is the contents of consciousness. In place of the Madhyamika conception of emptiness, the Yogachara substitute a specific image: the image of an empty vessel. The Yogachara then identify the empty vessel with its own conception of consciousness. As Ken correctly states in Integral Spirituality, in Yogachara thought this “vessel” is conceived of as a kind of “openness” or “clearing” wherein objects “arise,” or come into being. This conception is remarkably close to the conception of consciousness that we find in phenomenology. Indeed, Heidegger himself refers to “the clearing” in his work, though he calls this clearing “Being”; and in the essay, “A Conversation with a Japanese,” Heidegger himself explicitly identifies “Being” with the Zen conception of emptiness as “openness.” (To this extent, Ken’s philosophy is, like phenomenology, still a “philosophy of consciousness.”)
For the Yogachara, then, objects appear “within” the empty vessel of consciousness, or as the idealistic sub-school would have it, are “projections” (pratibhasa) of consciousness, emptiness and form are no longer radically distinct; the vessel can now be “filled” as it were. This is the third turning.
What the Yogachara does here is substitute the older orientation toward transcendence and discrimination, as found in the Prajnaparamita and Madhyamika, with an emphasis upon immanence and identity. Emptiness, now, IS form, as Ken would have it; or, as Trungpa and Zen would have it, form is form again, and mountains are mountains.
This emphasis upon immanence is taken over in toto by the Tantric schools such as the Dzokchen and Kashmiri Shaivism, both of which were heavily indebted to the Yogachara, and melded with the generally “world-centric” orientation of Tantrism.
And kela again from this post at Lightmind: http://lightgate.net/boards/viewtopic.php?t=6905&sid=61779fc1b243e17f447dab03f25844c6
there are clearly precedents for the “emptiness of other” teaching to be found in indian texts. yogachara works that refer to the tathagatagarbha are clearly the predecessors to this kind of thing; the tenth chapter of Lankavatara is filled with “emptiness of other” -type language. the problem goes back at least this far.
the last tract is perhaps the most illuminating (probably written by a ghost writer, but who cares). the issue of whether one is synonomous with the other has to do with the idea of whether or not there is something “else” besides the emptiness of phenomena. as i say the problem of “what remains in shunyata” (see Nagao’s paper) goes back to the Yogachara. they developed a rather involved way of speaking about such things so that they could talk about a kind of positive existence without admitting that it was some kind of “thing.” (the prasangika-madhyamika response to this approach was that it is slippery.) the other point he makes, which i think is important, is that while some authorities (i’m deliberately not going to call them “masters”) of the tradition speak of the “emptiness of other,” they are not necessarily evoking the jonangpa position of emptiness of other as the final truth, a position that, as far as i know, most buddhists regard as heretical. they are saying that the buddhist position differs from the position of traditions like Samkhya and Advaita Vedanta, which advocate the “emptiness of other” as the highest truth, but at the same time it incorporate the idea of the “emptiness of other,” and hence, buddhism “transcends and includes” vedanta (notice the polemical and rhetorical nature of this kind of gambit). in other words, the “emptiness of other” is not the highest truth; the “emptiness of self” is. but there is still a degree — even if a lesser degree — of truth to the position of “emptiness of other.” hopkins raises this idea is meditation on emptiness.
From the Introduction to Jeffrey Hopkin’s Meditation on Emptiness at http://www.wisdom-books.com/ProductExtract.asp?PID=14745
Previously, the yogi took the independent existence of things as the very basis of his life; now that he cannot find anything to call an object, he falls to the opposite extreme of utter nihilism. The middle way, which is not a blending of these extremes but an utter refutation of both inherent existence and total non-existence, becomes relevant and comprehensible for the first time. The two extremes are identified in experience, and it is possible to realize a sense of valid, nominal existence through gaining the understanding that emptiness is an elimination only of inherent existence.
Balder responded with this in a zaadz/ii forum on Buddhism & Pomo:
The following quotes are from The Golden Letters, by John Myrdhin Reynolds, a Tibetan translator and Dzogchen (Bon and Nyingma) practitioner.
“Is the Dzogchen doctrine of the Base (gzhi) radically different than the shunyata of the Madhyamaka, the so-called orthodoxy of Tibetan Buddhism? Is Dzogchen the one Buddhist doctrine that steps out of the mainstream of Buddhist teaching – its central doctrine of the Primordial State postulating the existence of a positive entity? This would make Dzogchen and Madhyamaka diametrically opposed, for if Dzogchen asserts the real existence of some positive entity, then the Madhyamaka dialectic would negate the arguments invoked for the existence of any such entity.
The thrust of Indian Buddhist philosophy, both Madhyamaka and Chittamatra, is epistemological, concerned with the problem of valid knowledge, whereas Tibetan thought is more ontological, concerned with the problem of being. Therefore, in Tibetan thought, and particularly in Dzogchen thought, a rather different philosophical vocabulary developed than that found in the translations of the Buddhist Shastras of Indian origin. In the Sutra system, shunyata is treated as an object of knowledge (yul). And here there is a specific method involved. By means of an exhaustive philosophical analysis, an empirical object is resolved into its ultimate constituents, which are defined as clusters of momentary events or “dharmas†occurring in empty space. The process of ordinary perception is dependent upon the anatomy and physiology of the sense organs and the nervous system, as well as the processing of sensory information correlated with memory by Manas (yid) or the bio-computer of the brain. Out of this raw sense data, a recognizable object is constructed by the Manas, like a color picture on a television screen or like a hologram. However, these bits of data, these dharmas or momentary events, are contingent and lack any inherent nature, and so, by way of a process of exhaustive analysis, the higher critical intellect (Skt. prajna) discovers that they are empty. They lack any abiding self; they lack any substance whatsoever. They are as ephemeral as electrical impulses, and they are not the same as consciousness (Skt. caitta). Yet these dharmas are all the mind knows of the external world. Indeed, out of these ephemeral dharmas or momentary event phenomena, the mind creates the perceived world. And through the discipline of repeated exhaustive analysis, the process known as Prajna, the practitioner discovers that all things, external and internal, are empty and lacking any substantial reality. All that remains after the completion of this exhaustive analysis is shunyata. Thus, this shunyata is an object of intellectual knowledge. But this is not how Dzogchen speaks of shunyata.
Some scholars assert that Dzogchen appears to speak of the Base (gzhi) as a subject or an existence which cognizes something (yul-can). Therefore they say that Dzogchen is like the gzhan-stong (shentong) theory entertained by the Jonangpa school of Tibet. A lively controversy has continued for several centuries between the proponents of this gzhan-stong theory and the orthodox proponents of the rang-stong position…
[However], the Nyingmapa presentation of Dzogchen is not an eternalist view (rtag lta-ba), as some scholars assert. Rather, according to their own account, Dzogchen represents a middle way between the extremes of eternalism (rtag) and nihilism (chad). One should not be led astray by the ontological rather than epistemological language employed in Dzogchen texts. According to Dzogchen, those who rigidly follow the Prasangika Madhyamika of Chandrakirti perpetually find themselves in danger of falling into the extreme of nihilism and asserting that nothing exists. They overly stress the negative side of shunyata. But the balance is redressed in Tantra and in Dzogchen, where shunyata has its positive side, which is luminous clarity (gsal-ba). This should not be perceived as an abandoning of the middle way by the Tantra system, and it must be remembered that there exists more than one interpretation of Madhyamaka.
In the early period of Tibet, the syncretistic Madhyamaka system of Shantirakshita was the prevalent form of Madhyamaka philosophy. This system of Shantirakshita was able to use the vocabulary of the Chittamatra (Yogachara) philosophy, but this did not mean that it uncritically adopted the philosophical standpoint of Chittamatra, “mind only.†The Tantra system likewise did this. But whereas the Sutra system, by means of philosophical analysis culminates in the realization of a universal shunyata as its conclusion, the Tantra system begins with the state of shunyata as a given, in terms of the three samadhis or contemplations, and it is out of this state of emptiness (stong-nyid ngang nas) that the transformation arises. This state of emptiness, the Tathata-samadhi, “the contemplation reality,†is the primal phase with which any sadhana or process of transformation begins. But this state is not just empty; it is simultaneously clear luminosity (gsal-ba), and this aspect is the second samadhi, the Samantabhasa-samadhi, “the contemplation of what manifests everywhere.†It is light or luminosity, whereas the first samashi refers to the depths of open empty space. The inseparable unity of these two brings into being the third samadhi, the Hetu-samadhi, or “causal contemplation,†the seed or germ out of which manifest forms are generated or created (bskyed-pa), like a tree growing from a seed. Commencing the sadhana practice in the purified primordial state of emptiness, which is like the clear open sky, the method of the Tantra proceeds to invoke and develop the energy that is concealed, enfolded, and inherent in the state of emptiness – that is to say, visible forms are regenerated or remanifested out of the pristine state of shunyata, just as they were at the time of the beginning, symbolically the time of the first creation. Shunyata, the state of emptiness itself, is the source of this primordial energy that brings all possible forms, even the universe itself, into manifestation. The vast and infinite empty space of the state of shunyata is pregnant with all possibilities; it has within itself the potentiality or creative energy for manifesting all possible manifestations, whether pure vision or impure vision, whether Samsara or Nirvana. In this way, during the course of sadhana practice, one’s obscurations of knowledge and one’s impure karmic vision are progressively purified.
Thus, the Base, the Primordial State, is not just emptiness in the sense of void or nothingness, a mere absence of something. Rather, the state of shunyata, the vast empty space where emptiness and luminosity are inseparable, represents the state of pure potentiality. It is the space or dimension or matrix of all existence out of which all possible forms or manifestations arise, like clouds appearing spontaneously in the empty open sky. It is not just that forms lack an inherent nature (rang-bzhin med-pa) or substance, but equally inherent in shunyata is the potentiality for the arising of forms; this is the meaning of luminosity (gsal-ba). Thus Dzogchen speaks of stong-cha and gsal-cha, “the side of emptiness†and “the side of clarity,†which are the two aspects or sides of the Primordial Base. These two aspects are also known as ka-dag, “primordial purity,†and lhun-grub, “spontaneous self-perfection.†This fact transcends conventional logic, because it is not a matter of the Base being either A or not-A, of being either emptiness or manifestation. If shunyata were a mere nothing, then nothing would arise at all. But this pure nonexistence or nothingness contradicts our experience. Thoughts and appearances are arising all the time, arising continuously, and this is only natural. But equally, if forms were not empty, then there would exist no possibility for change because all things would be locked up in a static unchanging state of their own self-identical essence or inherent nature (rang-bzhin, Skt. svabhava). But that is not our experience. We experience that things continuously change. They are in a state of becoming.
When Dzogchen speaks of the Base, it speaks of its qualities (gzhi’i yon-tan) in terms of Essence, Nature, and Energy. Its Essence (ngo-bo) is shunyata, and its Nature (rang-bzhin) is luminous clarity (gsal-ba), whereas their unity or inseparability is Energy (thugs-rje). Both of the Tibetan terms ngo-bo and rang-bzhin translate the single Sanskrit word, svabhava. Perhaps this is indicative that this particular line of philosophical thought developed in Tibet rather than India. But making these statements about the Base is not the same thing as asserting that it is a substance or an entity. The Base is empty. Dzogchen does not lapse or deviate from the central Buddhist teaching of Anatman into some kind of Shashvatavada, or eternalist view.
Dzogchen begins with shunyata because shunyata is the Base as its Essence (ngo-bo), but an entity called shunyata will not be found anywhere. If one looks into the mind to see where thought arises, where it abides, and where it goes, one will not find any place from where it arises, nor any place where it abides, nor any place where it goes to. Thoughts arise and dissolve, but they do not arise from anywhere and they do not go anywhere. This is their aspect of emptiness (stong-cha). Yet thoughts continue to arise incessantly; this is their aspect of inexhaustible luminosity (gsal-cha). And these two aspects are inseparable in the Base (gsal stong dbyer-med). This empty aspect of mind is its primordial purity (ka-dag), but this purity is not some substance or entity, not some mind-stuff out of which thoughts are made, like ocean waves made up of the water contained in the ocean. It is only the quality of the nature of mind, and the nature of mind remains primordially uncontaminated, unchanged, and unadulterated by whatever thoughts arise in the mind. Since this nature of mind, or sems-nyid, transcends the thought process (that is to say, Samsara) from the very beginning, being itself outside of the temporal process and the causal sequence, it is said to be primordially pure. But simultaneously it is mind, or sems. Mind has the power or capacity to bring all thoughts and phenomena into manifestation in consciousness through its latent energy. Forms continuously arise as manifestations of mind, and this is called spontaneous self-perfection (lhun-grub). Here there is no contradiction with the doctrine of Anatman.
Does this teaching of a Primordial State beyond cause and effect contradict the kerygma, the original core message of the Buddha? It is said in an ancient verse that “All conditioned things are impermanent, are without a self, and are suffering – this is the teaching of the Buddha.†But the Primordial State is not a thing or a substance. It is unconditioned (asamskrta-dharma), but ultimately it cannot be defined by the intellect or expressed in words. It is the Noble Silence that the Buddha maintained after he first attained enlightenment. And yet, because of his unstinting universal compassion for all sentient beings, he spoke of that which cannot be expressed in words. It is like trying to explain the taste of sugar to a man who has never tasted anything sweet. But all speech and language, as useful and as necessary as they may be, represent limitation. Language cannot perfectly mirror reality; direct experience transcends expression in words and arrangement in syllogisms. Just as the way to the mirror is through the reflections, so the Buddha spoke of the unconditioned (asamskrta-dharma), usually by way of negative statements, employing a kind of via negativa. Hence he spoke of Anatman and shunyata…..
[Here Reynolds describes early traditions within Buddhism that did not so heavily emphasize negative discourse]
…The view we find here [in the tradition of Subhuti] is the Dharma-nairatma or Dharma-shunya, the insubstantiality of all things. These momentary events called dharmas are also not real. This Second Turning of the Wheel of the Dharma, the promulgation of the Prajnaparamita Sutras, which expound the doctrine of Shunyavada, is regarded as the ultimate teaching of the Buddha by the Tibetan Lamas. But this teaching can be carried to extremes by way of destructive dialectics and, so, unfortunately can lead to nihilism. This trend was counterbalanced by the Third Turning of the Wheel of the Dharma in such Sutras as the Sandhinirmochana Sutra and the Lankavatara Sutra, and also by the Yogachara school’s emphasis on the importance of meditation practice, as against an overemphasis on philosophical analysis. In these Sutras, we find reference to the doctrine of the luminous quality of mind. Although the Second Turning in a sense is the ultimate teaching of the Buddha, the Third Turning was not just a sop thrown to those disciples who feared shunyata or who possessed a lesser intellectual capacity. Rather, it served as a corrective to a wrong or a purely negative understanding of the doctrine of shunyata. Chan, for example, when it first came to China was very much linked to the Lankavatara Sutra, which belongs to this Third Turning. Yet no one can accuse Chan of harboring a substantialist view or wrongly understanding shunyata. Like Tantra and Dzogchen, Chan approaches shunyata in terms of direct immediate experience rather than by way of philosophical analysis, as is the case with the Madhyamika school.â€
David Loy, in his review of The Foundational Standpoint of MÄdhyamika Philosophy By Gadjin Nagao, asks this concluding question:
http://ccbs.ntu.edu.tw/FULLTEXT/JR-PHIL/loy4.htm
“The PrÄsangika/SvÄtantrika debate makes me wonder what is really at stake in all such quests to discern what is really (as opposed to conventionally) real.”
And the answer, for me, returns to the pomo critique of an unconscious power drive inherent in such quests for the “real” and the “true.” I really don’t give a fuck anymore about such a quest.
Some more input from kela at Lightmind forum:
Posted: 08/13/07, 7:44 pm
I think Reynolds is using the term “ontology” here in a rather idosyncratic manner, one that reminds us of Heidegger’s idiosyncratic usage (which is by no means identical). Reynolds seems to mean something along the lines of “experiential” when he refers to the “ontological.” This is an odd usage.
I also feel that this is rather spurious distinction, and historically inaccurate — a description of “Indian” versus “Tibetan” Buddhism, drawn from the Tibetan tradition itself, that makes Indian Buddhism into a purely scholastic tradition, ie., the “sutra” tradition. (This, IMO, is the biggest problem with contemporary work on Tibetan Buddhism: it accepts what the tradition says of itself as a kind of historical fact.)
Case in point: One distinction we often read of in the context of Tantric Buddhism is that between the Pandit and the Siddha. Hence, Padmasambhava is a “Siddha,” while Shantarakshita is but a mere “Pandit.” While the Tantric distinction has some descriptive usefulness, I don’t we should overstate the distinction, as it clearly has a quasi-polemical and rhetorical basis to it. “Siddhas” here supposedly have first hand experiential knowledge of something (knowledge by acquaintance), while “pandits” only have secondary knowledge of some thing (knowledge by description). And blah blah blah, we are off to the mystical-empirical races, and but a short step from the tired and hackneyed Neo-advaita distinction between the sage and the pandit, with all its pukifying rhetorical ramifications: “YOU’RE just a pundit!” “He’s just a PUNDIT!” etc. Besides, it would be silly to maintain that Indian Madhyamika was merely scholastic while Tibetan Madhyamika is more “existential” or soteriological. For in many ways, the historical case is exactly the opposite.
Posted: 08/14/07, 3:51 pm
It will take me some time to go through this entire piece.
In any case, I will offer a few comments over the course of the next few days as I read sections.
The last paragraph confirms an earlier analysis of mine in which I had said that the Tibetan tantric tradition essentially appropriates the idea of the “third turning” of the wheel of dharma that we find in Yogachara texts, such as the Samdhinirmochana Sutra, under the general historical rubric of the three “yanas” — hinayana, mahayana, vajrayana.
Notice the last statement:
Quote: Like Tantra and Dzogchen, Chan approaches shunyata in terms of direct immediate experience rather than by way of philosophical analysis, as is the case with the Madhyamika school.
This is the kind of nonsense that I am referring to below. It reflects a polemical bias directed primarily at the school of Tsongkapa. Chandrakirti himself states that shunyata is known through a kind of cognition or perception (pratyaya) that is “not mediated through an other,” a kind of “absolute knowing,” as it were (and this is where “absolutistic” language creeps into Madhyamika discourse). The Lankavatara — which is supposedly the basis of Ch’an including its idea of “direct experience” — uses the same term, and Chandrkirtti may have adopted the term from this work, as he likes to cherry-pick quotations and terminology from it.
Posted: 08/14/07, 7:40 pm
Presumably this is the kind of thing that is bothering you:
Quote: This empty aspect of mind is its primordial purity (ka-dag), but this purity is not some substance or entity, not some mind-stuff out of which thoughts are made, like ocean waves made up of the water contained in the ocean. It is only the quality of the nature of mind, and the nature of mind remains primordially uncontaminated, unchanged, and unadulterated by whatever thoughts arise in the mind. Since this nature of mind, or sems-nyid, transcends the thought process (that is to say, Samsara) from the very beginning, being itself outside of the temporal process and the causal sequence, it is said to be primordially pure. But simultaneously it is mind, or sems.
I think that the Dzogchen strategy here closely parallels that of the Yogachara. That is, for both, emptiness is not the mere emptiness of phenomena, it is a kind of “vessel,” of sorts, that contains all phenomena and makes them possible — a kind of “clearing,” as it has been called. Incidently, even Chandrakirti speaks at times of emptiness as the “condition” for the possibility of phenomenal things. This is the odd quasi-metaphysical “theory” that the Madhyamika occassionally refers to (in the same manner that, after dismissing metaphysics as such, Wittgenstein says quasi-explanatory things like “metaphysics is grammar”).
To return to points I have made in other posts, this move to the “immanent ground,” or base as it is called here, is characteristic of all teachings inspired by the “third turning,” and of tantra in general. We could contrast the classical Advaita Vedanta of Shankara and Kashmiri Shavism in a similar manner. It’s an attempt to be more “inclusive” of everyday objects of consciousness. The real dialectic at work here is between the existential poles of “accepting” and “rejecting.”
I think we should note that here the charge of calling someone shentong was tantamount to calling someone a heretic in Tibet, as the tract implies. In the above, the Dzogchen is defending itself, just as the Yogachara did at one time, against the charge that it is returning to an idea of “svabhava,” inherent existence, when it speak of the “base.” When discussing this Reynolds speaks of a lively debate between “proponents of this gzhan-stong theory and the orthodox proponents of the rang-stong position.” Now what does this mean? Does “proponents of the gzhan-stong” theory refer to proponents of the theory of “emptiness of other” as such, or does it refer to the (polemical) assertion that Dzogchen is a but a mere instance of the shentong position? The language here is unclear. In other words, I’m suggesting the “lively debate” was not so much over the question of “emptiness of self” vs. “emptiness of other”; it was over the question of who (inadvertently) fell into the position of emptiness of other vs. those who did not.
Some more from the Lightmind Forum discussion:
Theurj: Posted: 08/15/07, 3:12 pm
From Barnaby, 2/14/06, 6:53 pm at http://tibetanbuddhism.tribe.net/thread/c9ef560a-2cd6-46df-9c21-82747fbb59f8
It is true that Vasubandhu is considered a Yogacarin, and the Dzogchenpas claim the Madhaymaka view. However, the doctrine of the Alaya is remarkably similar in Dzogchen and Yogacara, and both resemble the Clear Light Mind of the Sarma traditions.
It’s a tricky business, because the Tantra teachings are clearly strongly-influenced by the Third Turning of the Wheel of the Dharma. There are a number of teachers of ‘Emptiness-of-Other’ (Shentong) who assert that the Third Turning is, in fact, preeminent, above the Madhyamaka teachings. This includes the Jonangpas, and many of the Karma Kagyupas and Rime figures. Jamgon Kongtrul Rimpoche and Mipham Rimpoche seem to have advocated this position. Thrangu Rimpoche is an advocate of this view in modern times, and has written of this issue frequently.
The point of contention is whether or not Buddha asserted that the Alaya is truly-existent in the Third Turning. It is the position of many Tibetans, and all Gelukpas, that the Budda did say the Alaya inherently exists in the Third Turning Sutras. On this basis, they claim that the Yogacara school does not represent the definitive view of the Buddha.
Longchenpa appears to have held this view, and takes pains to distinguish between the Alaya of Yogacara from the Alaya of Dzogchen. Tulku Thundup writes in The Practice of Dzogchen: “In Dzogpa Chenpo the Intrinsic Awareness is designated as self-awareness and self-clarity. But it is free from elaborations and non-existence. So it is superior to the thoroughly established self-awareness and self-clarity of consciousness of the Yogacara school.” He gives a lengthy quotation from the master Longchenpa to support his interpretation.
That seems clear enough, but there does not seem to be consistency on this point among the masters. Many great Dzogchenpas make extensive use of Shantirakshita and Kamilashila’s presentation of Madhyamaka, for example, which is usually considered a Yogacara-Svantantrika-Madhyamaka synthesis. One of Mipham Rimpoche’s most important works is his long commentary on Shatirakshita’s “Ornament of the Middle Way”.
In my analysis, there is not a strong agreement on what the Third Turning position actually advocates, and whether or not the Alaya was held to be truly existent. Of course, even this isn’t a problems for the Shentongpas, who argue that emptiness itself truly exists. The important thing is that all of these traditions may direct the yogi to primordial awareness in the service of liberation and compassion. The rest is of limited importance, although I find it interesting. This is surely the most thorny, difficult, and controversial argument within all of Tibetan Buddhist doctrine, and many of the most profound works have been written to clarify these issues. Tsong Khapa’s magnum opus, the Legs Shed Nying Po, for example, is dedicated to clarifying the difference between the Three Yanas.
Kela: Posted: 08/15/07, 3:49 pm
Perhaps the discrepancy over what the third turning means can be traced back to the fact that there were two subschools of the Yogachara, two rival interpretations of Yogachara.
There was indeed a split within the Yogachara, (see here), and part of the issue concerned whether the alaya is a separate “entity” unto itself It is usually argued that Vasubandhu did not speak of the alaya in this manner. But a second subschool spoke of a kind of “pristine” (amala) unconditioned vijnana. It did not appear to find much favor in India, though it had its Indian proponents; it did however become the dominant view of Yogachara in China. In any case, the first school of Yogachara, Vasubandhu’s, also appears to also speak this way at times. For this reason, I find Yogachara language somewhat difficult to dicipher; they seem to want to have their cake and eat it. And unfortunately, most of the books in English have not helped the matter for the general public (i.e., they get lost in the pseudo-debate of whether or not Yogachara is some form of “idealism”).
I would be interested to know which Kagyus advocate the shentong position. I was not aware of this.
——
Another point is that, at least in part, the issue you speak of has to do with what is seen as the “philosophical underpinnings” of the various Tibetan traditions. This seems to be, to a fair degree, more or less an artificial construct having to do with allegiances. To be specific, for a long time, Shantirakshita’s philosophy (which was a synthesis of Madhyamika, Yogachara, and the Logical school) provided the philosophical “underpinning” for much of the Tibetan tradition. For example, at the Samyas debates, his school “won” the debate with a supposed Ch’an master, Mohoyen. It was hence afterwards the “official view” until it fell out of favor, partly for “political” reasons. Then, at a later time, the Prasangika Madhyamika came into favor, largely due to the influence of Tspngkapa and the rise to pre-eminence of the Gelugpas. Even today, we see a kind of lip-service payed to the Prasangika Madhyamika as the “received” philosophy of Tibetan tradition in general. We find this kind of thing, for example, in the writings of Mipham. And yet there are at the same time various sub-schools in Tibet that do not to appear to accept this idea of a kind of “central authority.” To my mind this “political” dimension is the cause of much doctrinal cloudiness in the Tibetan tradition as to what the “official” view is. In any case, we can see that in this sense, the issue is not merely philosophical.
Also, whether the “Buddha asserted something or other” is clearly a doctrinal issue. This is where the literary aspect of the two truths come in, and the whole question becomes one of hermeneutics. It is also largely arbitrary, as it hinges upon which texts are accepted as authoritative. Texts that are not accepted as authoritative will be relegated to the position of the second level truth. Again, the issue then is no longer philosophical, since it becomes primarily theological.
—–
Of course there are many permutations and subtlties on these matters of contention. I once saw a list of various subtle positions on the two truths that ran on for several pages! The Tibetans appear to like tabulating all these minutae. Perhaps it gave monks something to do during long Tibetan winters. Of course, these can be helpful to us when sorting out the various schools, and subpositions, of Indo-Tibetan philosophy. Shantirakshita’s Tattvasamgraha (lit. “The Collection of Viewpoints on Truth”) was an encyclopedic doxography, as well as a compendium of Buddhist refutations of rival heretical schools. It may have all started there.
Theurj: Posted: 08/16/07, 4:07 pm
From an interview with Topga Yulgyal Rinpoche at http://www.purifymind.com/InterviewTopga.htm
Q: What is the main philosophical school in the Karma Kagyu tradition?
TR: The Madhyamaka. Within that school the 3rd, 5th and 7th Karmapa emphasized the Shentong view. The 8th Karmapa, emphasized the Prasangika-Madhyamaka school, but Shentong as well, thus embracing both schools. The 16th Karmapa emphasized the Shentong view.
Posted: 08/17/07, 10:12 am
Regarding Thrangu Rinpoche, referenced above by Barnaby:
He is full holder and teacher of all the Kagyu vajrayana lineages and has a special, direct transmission of the Shentong philosophical tradition. (1)
Thrangu Rinpoche is one of the foremost scholars on the Shentong view and so in 2007 we will be receiving a teaching from Thrangu Rinpoche on one of Dolpopa’s treatises. (2)
1. http://www.rinpoche.com/shamatha.html
2. http://www.rinpoche.com/newsletters/newsltr4.06.htm
Kela: Posted: 08/17/07, 3:05 pm
The question theurg is asking is whether or not Dzogchen falls into the same dualism Vedanta falls into when it, Dzogchen, distinguishes between sems-nyid (=rigpa) and sems.
Excerpts from “Madhyamika Buddhism Vis-a vis Hindu Vedanta (A Paradigm Shift)†by Acarya Dharmavajra (Mr. Sridhar Rana) at http://www.yogacara.net/node/7247
However, the Buddhist ultimate truth is the absence of any such satta i. e. ultimately existing thing or ultimate reality. That is the significance of Shunyata- absence of any real, independent, unchanging existence (skt. svabhava). And that fact is the ultimate truth of Buddhism, which is diametrically opposite to the ultimate truth of the Hindu Brahman. So Shunyata can never be a negative way of describing the Atman- Brahman of Hinduism as Vinoba Bhave and such scholars would have us believe. The meaning of Shunyata found in Sutra, Tantra Dzogchen, or Mahamudra is the same as the Prasangic emptiness of Chandrakirti, i. e. unfindability of any true existence or simply unfindability. Some writers of Dzogchen and Mahamudra or Tantra think that the emptiness of Nagarjuna is different from the emptiness found in these systems. But I would like to ask them whether their emptiness is findable or unfindable; whether or not the significance of emptiness in these systems is also not the fact of unfindability- no seeing as it could also be expressed. Also some Shentong scholars seem to imply that the Shentong system is talking about a different emptiness. They say Buddha nature is not empty of qualities therefore, Buddha nature is not merely empty, it also has qualities. First of all the whole statement is irrelevant. Qualities are not the question and Buddha nature being empty of quality or not is not the issue. The Buddha nature is empty of Svabhava (real existence). Because it is empty of real existence, it has qualities. As Arya Nagarjuna has said in his Mula Madhyamika Karika: “All things are possible (including qualities) because they are empty “Therefore the whole Shentong/ Rangtong issue is superfluous. However, in Shentong, Buddha nature is also empty and emptiness means unfindable. In short, the unfindability of any true existence is the ultimate (skt. paramartha) in Buddhism, and is diametrically opposed to the concept of a truly existing thing called Brahman, the ultimate truth in Hinduism.
Now let’s examine relative truth (skt. samvritti satya). In Hinduism, the relative truth is the fact that this world is an illusion (skt. maya). It has no existence. In Buddhism, samsara is interdependently arising. It has relative existence (skt. samvritti satta) according to Tsong Khapa or it appears conventionally according to Gorampa Senge and Mipham. It is like an illusion (Skt. mayavat). Like all illusions, it appears interdependently based on various causes and conditions (Skt. hetu pratyaya). It may be like an illusion but it is the only thing we have, there is nothing behind it or beyond it which can be called an ultimate thing or reality. The ultimate reality or truth or fact in the Buddhist sense is the mode of existence of this illusion like samsara i. e. (Skt. nihsvabhava) empty of real existence. So here too we find two different parameters to two different paradigms. Now let us investigate some of the words used by both paradigms. One word that has created great confusion is non- dualism. First of all Hindu Vedanta is advaita and Madhyamika Advaya. Although they are sometimes use interchangeably by both systems, their meanings are as used in the two paradigms differ. In Hindu Vedanta, non dualism (advaita) means one without a second Skt: dvitiyam nasti, Chandogya Upnishad). What is the meaning of this? That there is only Brahman which really exists, nothing else really exists. In other words- the world does not exists at al- it is only am illusion. The true English word for this is Monism according to Webster Dictionary. The view that there is only one kind of ultimate substance. Since, as we have been seen already there is no kind of ultimate substance in Madhyamika Buddhism the meaning advaya (non-dualism) cannot be like in Hinduism. The Madhyamika scriptures very clearly defines advaya as “dvaya anta mukta” free from the two extremes. The extremes are the of eternalism into which the Hindu vedantic Brahman falls and Nihilism into which many materialistic system like Charvak fall. But it goes deeper. Non dual knowledge (skt. advaya jnana) is the state of mind which is soteriologically free from grasping at the two extremes of knowing in terms of “is” and “is not” and ontologically free from being “existing” or “non existing” Advaita jnana is however the knowledge of the one and only truly existing substance or reality called Brahman in Hinduism. It could also be called by any other name. Even if the Brahman is defined as beyond “is and” is not” as in the Yogavasistha, it is only a round about way of saying that there is an ultimate reality, Brahman, which is beyond concepts of existing and non existing and therefore it still falls within eternalism. There is also the use of :”free from the existence and non existence” in Buddhism and beyond existence and non existence in Hinduism. “Beyond” implies a third something which is neither; but “free” does not necessarily implies a third something which is neither. Some Shentongpas define the Tathagatagarbha exactly like the Brahman of the Vedanta without realizing it and even claim as a higher mediator’s view which is not accessible to lower class logicians etc.
Perhaps it is most apt now to talk about two other words used commonly by both paradigms: Nisprapanca (Tib: thro-me) and avikalpa (Tib: Tog- me). Nisprapanca means non fabricated and avikalpa means non- conceptual. In the context of Hinduism, it is the Brahman (the ultimate reality, the ultimate real, the ultimate existing) which is beyond concepts and non- fabricated. It also means a non-fabricated and non-conceptual knowledge of that Brahman. When I am using ultimate reality as a synonym for the Brahman. I am using reality to mean something that exists as per the Webster’s Dictionary. I am aware that reality also connotes “fact” i. e. truth and with such a meaning could be used in Buddhism to mean ultimate fact/truth. But as one of its connotation is existing, it is hazardous to use the word ultimate reality in any Buddhist context and it is always safer to use the word ultimate truth instead. Some English translations of Dzogchen, Mahamudra etc. have used the word ultimate reality for Rigpa, co- emergent wisdom (skt. sahaja jnana) Tathagata garbha, rather indiscriminately without the authors even realizing that the use of such lax wording brings them not only dangerously close to Vedantins of one form or the other, but also they are actually using Buddhist texts to validate the Vedantic thesis. If some of them object that their ultimate reality is empty while the Hindu ultimate reality is not; the Hindu can ask,” then how it is an ultimate reality in the sense of ultimate existing”? To avoid this confusion, it is safer and semantically closer to the Buddhist paradigm to use only “ultimate truth”.
I’m also wondering to what degree Bon plays a part in this notion of rigpa, given its dualistic theism, shamanism and animism. It’s almost like in the syncretistic attempt to incorporate Bon that Dzogchen might have retained some of its pre-rational belief structure, only re-contextualized (or rationalized?).
From Ancient Tibetan Bonpo Shamanism by Vajranatha at http://www.vajranatha.com/teaching/TibetanShammanism.htm
In Tibet, however, this Indian Buddhism has been amalgamated with the ancient indigenous shamanism and pagan animism of that country, thus giving Tibetan Buddhism its unique and especially colorful character.
The shaman was able to function as a healer and a guide of souls pre-eminently because of his or her mastery of alternate states of consciousness, “the archaic states of ecstasy”, so that one could voluntarily enter the Otherworld of the spirits, a non-ordinary reality parallel to our familiar world of the senses and its conventional reality.
This ancient Tibetan shamanism and animism, the pre-Buddhist spiritual and religious culture of Tibet, was known as Bon, and a practitioner of these shamanic techniques of ecstasy and ritual magic, the methods of working with energy, was known as a Bonpo.
The history of the development of Bon may be divided into three phases:
1. Primitive Bon more or less corresponds to the archaic shamanism and
paganism of ancient Northern and Central Asia.
2. Yungdrung Bon or Old Bon (bon rnying-ma) was the high religious culture of the ancient kingdom of Zhang-zhung which centered around Gangchen Tise or Mount Kailas in Western Tibet…. Besides shamanism, healing, magical rites of exorcism, astrology, and divination (these practices belong to the four lower or Causal Ways among the Nine Ways of Bon), Yungdrung Bon contained the higher spiritual teachings and practices of Sutra, Tantra, and Dzogchen.
3. New Bon (bon gsar-ma) was a deliberate and conscious amalgamation of the Bon of Zhang-zhung with the Buddhism of Indian origin, especially as this spiritual tradition was represented by the Nyingmapa school in Tibet…. On the other side of the matter, many ancient Bonpo rituals and practices have been accepted into the Buddhist schools of Indian origin in Tibet and, in particular, as the cult of the Guardian spirits, the old pagan pre-Buddhist deities of Tibet who are now the protectors of the Dharma.
Thus it came about that the archaic shamanic techniques of the Palaeolithic have now been absorbed into the high spiritual and intellectual culture of both Buddhism and Bon in Tibet….. Thus, in Tibetan culture, we find a harmonious integration of the archaic techniques of altered states of consciousness deriving from a primordial North Asian shamanism with the highly sophisticated psychic sciences of Buddhism and Bon.
Ken says in BHE, pp. 237-8:
“So it is not necessary for you to change your state of consciousness in order to discover this nonduality. Any state of consciousness you have will do just fine, because nonduality is fully present in each state… recognition is the point. Recognition of what always already is the case.
Change of state is useless, a distraction.â€
I understand that Dzogchen “says” something similar, in that rigpa is our natural, intrinsic awareness and that we must rid the obstructions to that awareness. In that sense it is “always already” and we are not “attaining” anything, just uncovering what is there. But it seems to me that the meditative machinations of Dzogchen are also inextricably linked to the Bon archaic, altered states of consciousness of “another realm.” Hence the dualistic, shentong nondualism of Dzogchen falling prey to the same in Vedanta.* And hence my confusion.
I can’t be the first to notice this. What are your (collective) thoughts? Can you point me to some research on this?
*I’m also seeing a correlation of why Ken uses Vedanta and Vajrayana in describing “states” of consciousness, as it appears they have this same dualistic nondualism based on the indiginous pre-rational, “magical” traditions. If this kind of nondualism and states of consciousness are legitimately challened by the Prasangika this would have serious implications on the validity of Ken’s integral model.
It really isn’t complicated, it’s just that these endless spiritual tracts that people for some reason spend their lives picking over (as if reading and thinking and arguing about them, rather than simply meditating, were the point) make it seem so. There is full consciousness, which is allegedly non-dual. Then there are various states in which that consciousness is partially realized.
Since whatever limited consciousness we do have is that full consciousness, partially realized, one can say that in a sense we realize the non-dual. Just as you could look out of a dirty, cloudy or opaque window and say that you are seeing the world. Not as well as if the window were cleaner or clearer or absent entirely, but it is the same world that we are seeing, to the extent that we are seeing anything all.
But saying that one does not have to change one’s state of consciousness is one of those paradoxical statements that make sense only from the non-dual perspective. From any other perspective, of course you have to change your state of consciousness. If recognition is the point, you have to recognize, and since you ordinarily don’t recognize, something has to change. Again, from the point of view of the non-dual, nothing changes, but it definitely does from the point of view of anyone in the dual.
In response to the charge of nihilism (there is no “there” there), if I’m understanding one accepted interpretation of Pransangika correctly then the “there” is most certainly there in the form of the everyday, relative world. Although it lacks independent, inherent existence or “selfhood” it exists nonetheless and so-called nondual enlightenment is this exact realization instead of trying to separate it into an absolute and a relative realm. So the realization is not a specific state of consciousness but applies in all states, stages, circumstances etc, just without the need to make it into something special. One doesn’t have to have a separate, special “practice” to develop states of consciousness to have this realizaton. Rather every moment is an opportunity to practice this presence. And when we do practice sitting still and being quiet, we are again practicing presence in that activity and any “state” it elicits, but that particular practice or state is not something special or “spiritual” over the other moments, states or experiences. It’s just sitting still and being quiet with the same realization as any other moment.
Bringing this back to rigpa, it seems the more “advanced” Dzogchen practices are about developing a “rainbow body” that literally can disintegrate in the physical plance and become pure radiance in a spiritual plane. Sounds a bit more magical dualism than what I’ve described above. And unnecessary unless we make being more “spiritual” the dualistic prize at the end of the rainbow.
On the other hand I can see why rigpa is likened to a clear, primoridial “awareness,” which is a sort of “consciousness” but not a “state” of consciousness. And I can see why this awareness is called empty, because it is present in all states and stages. So in that sense yes, it is a “change” of perspective or view, though those terms might not suffise either, because it seems present in all perspectives and views. And perhaps Andy is also right that it’s a matter of trying to eff the inefffable, yet at the same time it would seem that this awareness is also present even in concepts and language; it’s not restricted to a pure, nonconceptual “state.”
From commentary by Lama Tashi Namgyal on The Aspiration Prayer of Mahamudra, the Definitive Meaning, composed by The Lord Protector Rangjung Dorje, The Third Gyalwa Karmapa.
http://www.abuddhistlibrary.com/Buddhism/A%20-%20Tibetan%20Buddhism/Authors/Tai%20Situ%20Rinpoche/Commentary%20on%20the%20Wishing%20Prayer%20for%20the%20Attainment%20of%20%20%20Mahamud/Text%20version/Issue3.htm
Those who adhere to the madhyamika rangtong view hold that the second turning of the wheel of dharma — the second cycle of the Buddha’s sutra teachings — constitutes the Buddha’s definitive teachings on the true nature of reality, and that the teachings of the third turning of the wheel of dharma are provisional, a kind of make-up course of slightly less profound teachings designed for those who couldn’t understand the teachings of the second turning.
Those who adhere to the madhyamika shentong view, on the other hand, hold that the third turning of the wheel of dharma constitutes the Buddha’s definitive teachings on the nature of reality and that the teachings of the second turning are the provisional teachings. They maintain that anyone who succeeds in meditation in freeing themselves completely from the attempt to understand one’s reality conceptually will ultimately experience the clear light nature of mind. They further maintain that those of the rangtong view who fail to recognize that ultimate reality is the clear light nature of mind are still subject to a subtle form of conceptual grasping.
When the nondualistic experience of the mind’s true nature arises, rather than allowing it simply to experience itself, those of the rangtong view try to look at it to see if it is permanent, indivisible, etc. This attempt to analyze, or even just observe, the experience dualistically, however subtle, causes the experience to disappear, thereby confirming the rangtong view that all phenomenon are impermanent and empty of any true existence. The shentong view maintains, however, that if rangtongpas continue to meditate properly, they will gradually purify even this subtle tendency and then the true nature will dawn in them.
The vajrayana view corresponds to the view of the third turning of the wheel of dharma, the shentong view, though it is based on the tantric teachings of the Buddha and is not of the sutra tradition. Thus Situ Rinpoche’s commentary on The Aspiration Prayer of Mahamudra, the Definitive Meaning, is based on this view.
“One doesn’t have to have a separate, special “practice†to develop states of consciousness to have this realizaton. Rather every moment is an opportunity to practice this presence.”
I think the second sentence in that statement is universally accepted. I don’t know of any school that would deny it. The truth of the first sentence depends on what you mean by “separate, special”. If you mean something done only at certain times or places, then yes, there is nothing separate or special. If you mean something done that is not ordinarily done by people, then no, the practice is separate and special.
“And when we do practice sitting still and being quiet, we are again practicing presence in that activity and any “state†it elicits, but that particular practice or state is not something special or “spiritual†over the other moments, states or experiences. It’s just sitting still and being quiet with the same realization as any other moment.”
Practice is not a matter of “sitting still and being quiet”. It’s a matter of stilling the mind. This can be done in any activity–and must be, for the practice to be successful.
Andy,
I question whether “stilling the mind” is requisite, if by that you mean the cessation of thought. I think one can “witness” thoughts and witness the cessation of thoughts (and everything else), but I don’t think the cessation of thought per se is the “practice” but rather the detached witnessing. I can see how that might be described as “stilling the mind,” but I don’t know if that’s how you see it.
I do know that many meditators do see the practice as the stopping of thought. I posted below my favorite David Loy quote on the matter, which has been posted here before:
From http://www.holosforum.org/davidloy.html:
Well, this relates to the way we understand spirituality and meditation. For example, we often tend to understand meditation—in Zen especially—as getting rid of thoughts. We think that if we can just get rid of thought, then we can see the world as it is, clearly, without any interference from conceptuality. We view thinking as something negative that has to be eliminated in order to realize the emptiness of the mind. But this reflects the delusion of duality, rather than the solution to duality. As Dogen put it, the point isn’t to get rid of thought, but to liberate thought. Form is emptiness, yet emptiness is also form, and our emptiness always takes form. We don’t realize our emptiness apart from form, we realize it in form, as non-attached form. One of the very powerful and creative ways that our emptiness takes form is as thought. The point isn’t to have some pure mind, untainted by thought, like a blue, completely empty sky with no clouds. After a while that gets a little boring! Rather, one should be able to engage or play with the thought processes that arise in a creative, non-attached, nondualistic way. To put it in another way, the idea isn’t to get rid of all language, it’s to be free within language, so that one is non-attached to any particular kind of conceptual system, realizing that there are many possible ways of thinking and expressing oneself. The freedom from conceptualizing that we seek does not happen when we wipe away all thoughts; instead, it happens when we’re not clinging to, or stuck in, any particular thought system. The kind of transformation we seek in our spiritual practices is a mind that’s flexible, supple. Not a mind that clings to the empty blue sky. It’s a mind that’s able to dance with thoughts, to adapt itself according to the situation, the needs of the situation. It’s not an empty mind which can’t think. It’s an ability to talk with the kind of vocabulary or engage in the way that’s going to be most helpful in that situation.
“I don’t think the cessation of thought per se is the “practice†but rather the detached witnessing.”
Stilling thought is the way to detachment. Stilling thought is the same thing as transcending it.
“We view thinking as something negative that has to be eliminated in order to realize the emptiness of the mind. But this reflects the delusion of duality, rather than the solution to duality.’
I would say Loy’s problem is that he interprets stilling thought in negative terms! That is his own limited perspective showing through. Likewise when he compares pure mind with a boring blue sky. There is nothing boring about the pure mind. Boring is the mind obscured with thoughts, and not even aware that it is.
A transcending process by definition transcends both negative and positive. I guess if you were a cell in the body, and you found a practice that enabled you to identify with the whole organism, and you tried to describe that process to other cells, they might respond that you were regarding cell life as negative, that the point was to be a free cell, and so on and so on.
“Rather, one should be able to engage or play with the thought processes that arise in a creative, non-attached, nondualistic way. To put it in another way, the idea isn’t to get rid of all language, it’s to be free within language, so that one is non-attached to any particular kind of conceptual system, realizing that there are many possible ways of thinking and expressing oneself.”
That sounds more like vision-logic than enlightenment. Loy is a writer. He makes his living by producing books. It is not in his interest to accept the notion that enlightenment is beyond thoughts and words, because then he would be out of a job, wouldn’t he? He might still write, just as one might hold any kind of job, but he would have to recognize that his writing is simply another activity to be done while detaching, that his words don’t speak to what enlightenment is.
The same can be said for Wilber, whose entire project might be summarized as an attempt to connect enlightenment with rational, literary, scientific Western thought. If one doesn’t accept this premise, there is no longer a project.
Kela at Lightmind (referenced above) said recently that “the shentong view is virtually indistinguishable from the advaita view.”
This is why I noted above that Ken chooses Vedanta & Vajrayana in his formulation of the “hierarchy” of state-stages of consciousness. If we rather choose to accept the rangtong view we don’t have to go through state training to achieve horizontal “enlightenment” or nondual realization. Of course then one is accused of boomeritis or relativistic Buddhism and relegated to the green level of interpretation. Funny how Nargarjuna was green before his time.
The latter of course calls into question Ken’s vertical enlightenment as well because if the rangtong view is actually more turquoise (or beyond) structurally then perhaps Ken’s vertical compass is also off. Which of course might lend support to pomoers like Derrida et al actually being the vanguard of both horizontal and veritcal enlightenment because once again that distinction is part of the dualism that is part of the “problem” in the first place. Yes, heresy, I know.
A bit more history from Traleg Kyabgon Rinpoche in “Buddhadharma, The Practitioner’s Quarterly,†Fall 2003 at http://www.thebuddhadharma.com/issues/2003/fall/index.html
Emptiness / Buddhanature
The Buddhist schools are rich and varied in their perspectives, but these many points of view all advance the Buddhist concept of the middle view (madhya-drshti in Sanskrit and ume tawa in Tibetan).
The middle view avoids the extremes of eternalism and nihilism. Any view that does not fall into the parameters of the middle view—in other words, all views that fall into the extremes of eternalism or nihilism—are referred to as wrong views in Buddhist literature. The Buddha and his subsequent followers have called these wrong views because the nihilistic view minimizes what is there in reality, while the eternalistic view adds more to reality than what is really there.
Adherents of all Buddhist schools try to understand everything about themselves—their consciousness, the material world, sentient life, their karmic inheritance and its history, even rebirth or reincarnation—in terms of this middle view. In the Mahayana tradition, the establishment of the middle way is also an aspect of one’s own practice, because the Buddhist adherent steers a course between the two extremes to cultivate the two wisdoms: transcendental knowledge (Skt., prajna) and wisdom/gnosis (Skt., jnana).
The Madhyamaka and Yogacara Schools
With the emergence of Mahayana thought, this middle view was critically examined and taken to highly refined levels of philosophical sophistication. There were two major strands of Buddhist thought in the Mahayana: Madhyamaka and Yogacara. These two schools have had an enormous impact on the cultural, philosophical and religious landscape of Buddhist thinking in the whole of Asia, from India to Japan and beyond. Madhyamaka and Yogacara have produced original and somewhat different (although not necessarily incompatible) interpretations of the middle view. Their perspective on how enlightenment is to be attained is also different.
For the Madhyamikas (or Shunyatavadins), enlightenment is obtained by the practice of the two accumulations, merit and wisdom. In order to carry out this necessary but difficult task with minimal risk of deviations and diversions, the practitioner must engage in the six transcendental actions (Skt., paramitas). From the first four transcendental actions one accumulates merit, while the last two transcendental actions lead to the accumulation of wisdom (which includes both transcendental knowledge and wisdom/gnosis). The reason for practicing these accumulations is to reduce one’s negative karmic inheritance and delusional tendencies. As Nagarjuna, the founder of the Madhyamaka school, continually stated, it is only by developing the middle view that one can gain an understanding of emptiness (Skt., shunyata), which is ultimate reality itself. This understanding of emptiness is applied to the rest of the transcendental actions, so that even the merit that issues forth from one’s practice is seen to be empty of substance or inherent existence. In other words, it is through the realization of emptiness that one attains enlightenment.
The Yogacarins (or Vijnanavadins), on the other hand, advanced a slightly different perspective on how the two accumulations are to be realized. For Maitreya and Asanga, the founders of the Yogacara school, the main concern was establishing buddhanature (Skt., tathagatagarbha) as fact.
It was their firm belief that the reality of buddhanature was the foundation upon which all the Mahayana paths and stages were to be erected. They reasoned that if enlightenment were possible—not just in principle but as a realizable actuality—then each sentient creature must possess that enlightened nature. It is only due to the presence of ignorance that sentient creatures have not realized their “existentially intimate†and yet “experientially and cognitively distant†nature.
The key text that Maitreya and Asanga authored—which is widely used by followers of the Kagyü and Nyingma traditions of Tibetan Buddhism—is known as the Mahayanuttaratantra (in one of its shorter names). Its recurrent theme is the removability of the defilements. These defilements are all that obscure the innate purity of one’s inherent buddhanature, which exists in an uncorrupted and incorruptible fashion within the continuum of one’s being.
The difference between these two philosophical schools is that the Madhyamikas see the realization of emptiness as the one uniquely significant insight, whereas the Yogacarins see the realization of buddhanature as the very essence of awakening. In the Prajnaparamita sutras, the canonical Mahayana Buddhist sutras upon which Nagarjuna singularly relied, the subject matter is principally about emptiness. In them, shunyata is portrayed as the “Mother of all the buddhas,†because enlightenment arises from the realization of emptiness. According to the Yogacarins, the source of enlightenment is buddhanature, which is pure and untainted by defilements. However, it is the understanding of emptiness that allows one to realize this buddhanature.
There is very little evidence in Indian literature to suggest that there were any critical exchanges in India between these two prominent Buddhist philosophical schools. However, after the transplantation of Buddhism to Tibet, matters became wildly different. Rival schools of Tibetan Buddhist tradition, each claiming to be faithfully following the preceding Indian schools, engaged in a flurry of scholarly exchanges in which the concept of buddhanature was subjected to severe critical discussion.
These rival schools could not agree on the nature of buddhadharma and its status within the Mahayana teachings as a whole. Their disputes mainly came down to this: “Is buddhanature to be treated as a definitive teaching, or is it an interpretative teaching that relies on explanations to reveal itself?†Many latter-day Kagyü masters, for example, came to accept the teachings on buddhanature as belonging to the definitive class of Mahayana teachings. Those who followed strictly Madhyamaka interpretations of emptiness, on the other hand, did not accept this interpretation. For them, it had pedagogical value only, something that an individual grows out of as he or she develops a deeper understanding of emptiness. They argued that it is only through emptiness that all conceptual categories are deconstructed, and that these conceptual categories include the notion of buddhanature.
We can see, then, that the Yogacara teachings have had just as much influence on the development of Kagyü and Nyingma thought as the Madhyamaka ones, although no Kagyü or Nyingma teacher would consider him- or herself to be a Yogacarin. What the early and contemporary Kagyü teachers have done is combine the Yogacara teachings on buddhanature and the Madhyamaka teachings on emptiness.
The Rangtong and Shentong Distinction
Further complications regarding the understanding of buddhanature occurred in Tibet as a result of the marriage of these two streams of thought within the Kagyü and other Buddhist schools. This marriage led to the development of the distinctly Tibetan philosophical tradition called the Shentong (“emptiness of otherâ€) school. The Shentongpas charged those schools that interpreted the teachings on emptiness as definitive with falling into the extreme of nihilism. These schools, known in this context as upholders of Rangtong (“emptiness of itselfâ€), counter-charged the Shentongpas with falling into the extreme of eternalism.
It should be noted at this point that many great Kagyü and Nyingma masters have not arrived at the same conclusion as the Shentongpas regarding the concept of buddhanature. Rather, they have accepted the reality of buddhanature while maintaining the Rangtong view of emptiness of itself. Accepting the reality of buddhanature does not mean that one has to accept the Shentong interpretation of emptiness. Shentongpas regard the nature of mind as empty of defilements but not empty of its intrinsic nature. The notion of buddhanature, however, does not in itself imply that mind has any intrinsic nature. Many of the great Kagyü and Nyingma masters, in fact, have interpreted buddhanature to mean that mind is empty of both the defilements and any kind of inherent existence.
The Mahayanuttaratantra itself may yield a conclusion that is consistent with the Rangtong view of emptiness of itself. A true Shentongpa, if there is such a person, is seen by Rangtongpas as always being at risk of reifying buddhanature, thus falling into the extreme of eternalism—a Buddhist heresy. However, for our purposes, we need not be detained by these different interpretations. Suffice it to say that the appropriations and intermingling of the Madhyamaka and Yogacara traditions within Tibetan Buddhism has had a rather complicated and illustrious history.
From a review of Hopkin’s Meditation on Emptiness at http://www.amazon.com, below. It would appear that there is an “analytical” meditation/practice tradition wherein one can attain to “direct experience” of the nondual.
“This book started it all. It is a work of amazing depth which plunges into the Tibetan exegesis of the Indian Madhyamaka meditation. This analytical meditation tradition is designed to induce, through meticulous analysis, a direct perception of the absence of the mental and perceptual distortions which are at the root of suffering….Professor Hopkins primarily focuses his exegesis on the practical instructions of Chandrakirti as they are espoused by Tibetan masters Jam-yang-shay-ba, Nga-wang-bel-den, and Jang-gya. It is said by some that an analytic approach to meditation is contrary to the non-dual nature of realization in the Buddhist tradition. Such a view loses sight of the fact that all of these reasonings are aimed precisely at giving rise to such a direct experience.”
From Acharya Lama Tenpa Gyaltsen at http://www.bodhionline.org/analytic_meditation.html
Meditation: Two Types
Within the Buddhist tradition, one generally distinguishes between two types of meditation. One type is a resting meditation or settling the mind, and the other is an analytical or investigating meditation. Some practitioners think that these two forms of meditation are in opposition to each other, like water and fire. That view implies that if you have one, you cannot have the other. One might think that if you practice analytical meditation, you will not be able to place the mind evenly in absorption meditation, and if you practice absorption meditation, it will exclude the possibility of analytical meditation.
However, great lineage masters such as Khenpo Tsultrim Gyamtso Rinpoche and Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche have expressed the view that one should not regard these two types of meditation in this way. Instead of seeing resting and analytical meditation as being in opposition to each other, one should understand that in order to gain a genuine meditation, one should practice these together; moreover, each one will benefit the other. This view is similar to the understanding of the interrelationship of shamatha and vipashyana.
How one practices these two types of meditation together, however, depends on one’s individual inclination. For instance, you may want to emphasize analytical meditation more and spend comparatively less time on absorption meditation, while another person may have an inclination to spend more time on absorption meditation and less on analytical meditation. Therefore, the type of meditation to be emphasized depends on the individual. Generally speaking, individuals who have had less education, or who have lacked the opportunity for formal education, may spend more time on absorption meditation. On the other hand, individuals who have received extensive education, or who have had the opportunity to develop their mental capacities, may spend more time on analytical meditation.
There is only one kind of meditation. It may have different appearances at different times–stopping thought, transcending thought, being aware of surroundings, relaxing the body–but they are all part of the same process, and eventually one comes to see this.
I would not trust any book or teacher who believes that there is more than one kind of meditation. This sounds to me very much like someone who has not gone very far on the path, and is seeing differerent facets or aspects without recognizing they are really all the same. The statement “one should understand that in order to gain a genuine meditation, one should practice these together; moreover, each one will benefit the other” is in that direction, though seems to fall short of recognizing this. As long as one thinks they are different approaches, one can’t practice them together. When one sees they aren’t, the word “together” no longer really applies.
Do some research Andy. It is well recognized within Buddhist tradition that there is a distinction between analytic/discerning (vipassana) and placement/calm abiding/stablizing (samatha) meditation. It is not an aberrant meditator that thinks so. You can disagree with that traditional distinction but it exists and for good “reason.”
Why do people worship these texts so blindly? I’m telling you this is a false distinction. I really don’t care how many texts repeat it.
These texts may be fine for beginners, but at a certain point one should rely on one’s own experience. If someone has been practicing for as long as several years and still has to consult these texts to understand what meditation is, I would say that person has not really been practicing.
The information comes from not only “scholars” of Buddhism but lifetime practitioners of meditation and is verified by my own experience. So as I said you can disgree with them (and me) but it has nothing to do with lack of understanding or experience.
In my experience it does. I am as certain of this as I am certain that I am alive. I would not simply bet my life on this, I do bet it, everyday. Staying alive depends on using these principles.
One might crudely use the analogy of different paths to the top of the mountain. The point is you can only get so far up before everyone is on the same path. What that analogy does not capture very well is that that point is not very far. Long before full realization of nondual one is aware that all these apparently different aspects of meditation have to be the same. If they weren’t, how could there be a non-dual? If there is no distinction between outer and inner, how could there be different forms of meditation based on outer awareness and inner thoughts? How could either one lead to the other?
There are many other indications in these texts that the authors really did not have very deep experience. For example, I have never seen any of these texts point out the effects that different activities have on level as well as type of awareness. One problem, certainly not the only one, was that many of them withdrew from society and regular activities. This makes it harder to see these relationships, as well as the more fundamental one between inner and outer.
Here’s another quoted text, this time apparently agreeing with Andy, at least in the second paragraph. The author though, Hopkins, was also referenced above from another of his works, with which Andy took issue regarding the analytic/calm abiding distinction.
From The Kalachakra Tantra: Introduction by Jeffrey Hopkins, pp. 19-20.
The path of developing a wisdom consciousness realizing the absence of inherent existence to the point where it can serve as an actual antidote to the afflictive obstructions depends upon developing one-pointed concentration with analytical meditation so that eventually analytical meditation, rather than harming stabilizing meditation, serves to induce a greater degree of stabilizing meditation, and vice versa. It is said that a calm abiding of the mind—a stability of the mind—that is induced, nto by stabilizing meditation, but by analytical meditation, far exceeds that induced only by stabilizing meditation.
Still, such a meditative stabilization that is a union of calm abiding and special insight is also not sufficient. The emptiness of inherent self-existence, which is the object of this consciousness of meditative stabilization, is being seen through the medium of a conceptual image called a meaning-generality. Gradually, the meaning-generality of emptiness is removed, one’s consciousness and the emptiness of inherent existence that is its object become less and less dualistic, and finally one achieves direct perception of emptiness in a totally non-dualistic cognition. It is non-dualistic in five senses:
1. there is no conceptual appearance
2. there is no sense of subject and object – subject and object are like fresh water poured into fresh water
3. there is no appearance of inherent existence
4. there is no appearance of conventional phenomena; only emptiness appears
5. there is no appearance of difference—although the emptiness of all phenomena in all world systems appear, they do not appear to be different.
And not even the above is “it,” as he continues:
“Even this degree of perception of emptiness only removes artificially gained afflictive obstructions, that is, apprehensions of inherent existence gained through the fortification of study, analysis, and systems of philosophy. It is not sufficiently powerful to remove the innate afflictive obstructions—the ignorance, desire, and so forth that even animals and babies have.”
And on and on it goes. Now keep in mind that all this relates to the topic in that this “tantric” Bbuddhist perspective is “shentong” and finds itself superior to the rangtong perspective. The former even calls the latter a mere “philosophical” realization not equal to itself. You can see reflections of this in my conversation with Andy. It is an old, old debate within Buddhism and it is “legitimate” from both sides. In Ken’s words, I see it as a same-level legitimate debate rather than a higher-lower level debate. While those favoring the shentong see it is a higher-lower level debate along the lines of Ken’s usual superiority complex.
Now I could be wrong. And I could be less developed in meditative sciences than Andy. And Dzogchen and tantra in general could be right about it being a “higher” vehicle surpassing the rangtong. But I have strong doubts still due to the shamanistic roots of tantra in India and Tibet, with such roots positing a dualistic “spirit” realm opposed to the mundane. Notice above how even an “advanced” nondual experience is still tainted by the “innate afflictive obstructions” of animals and babies! We are inherently defiled and only the special, magical powers of such traditions can “save” us. Maybe.
Frankly, I read stuff like this, and MEGO (my eyes glaze over). Emptying the mind is hard enough under any conditions, let alone when you are letting stuff like this come into it. Meditation remains extremely simple in principle (as opposed to practice). It only becomes complicated when people try to describe it, and get twisted up in words, as I would say this author, and many others, have.
His five points are at least a little more straightforward, but how much help are they, really? I don’t think they’re of that much use to meditators. One can find descriptions much like these in any number of texts, and it really doesn’t matter how accurate they are, because all they can do for meditators is inspire them to seek. It seems to me that much more valuable would be detailed descriptions not of some higher state, but of what happens during the journey to that state, where IME seekers spend most if not all their lives. Some of this can be found in texts, but considering how potentially valuable it should be, there doesn’t seem to be that much, and much of what there is I think is not very helpful. A lot of it has been written by individuals in very ascetic conditions, who have not necessarily distinguished what is a feature of a somewhat higher state and what is a feature of fairly severe isolation. The constant emphasis on thoughts, feelings, lights, symbols, etc., is the result. There are descriptions of the outer world, and one’s interaction with it, a lot of poetry works in this realm, but again, it deals with the final state, not the intermediate, which is a lot messier. Wilber makes the further point that mystics in different traditions will see symbols that are particular to the interpretations of their traditions, but he doesn’t seem to realize that there still can be universal experiences at these intermediate stages. These are the kind of experiences that need descriptions, but I see very little of this.
On the other hand, if these points are intended as data to fit into integral or some other theory, they are too much open to debate. For example, to say there is no sense of subject and object suggests dualism. One could say there is and there isn’t, rather as one can say one has separate body parts, yet all are part of one thing. Likewise, one could argue of over the definition of “inherent†existence. Needless to say, the literature is full of debates over questions like these, which of course is what scholars do, but the point is, there is no way ever to settle these debates at the verbal/rational level. Even someone who has profound experience of a higher state may not necessarily be much of an authority for scholars, because being a scholar is to a large degree a matter of being very fluent with language, which by definition is something to be transcended.
I get the impression that many people interested in these matters eventually find one school or teacher that they like, and stay with that. If it inspires them to seek, they should eventually get beyond the need or use of that teacher or school, and whatever weaknesses or limitations that teacher or school had won’t matter.
Some interesting history from “The Bonpo Traditions of Dzogchen” by Vajranatha at http://www.vajranatha.com/teaching/BonpoDzogchen.htm
In general, the Dzogchen teachings are found only in the old unreformed Tibetan schools of the Buddhist Nyingmapas and the non-Buddhist Bonpos. In both cases, these teachings are substantially the same in meaning and terminology, and both traditions claim to have an unbroken lineage coming down to the present time from the eighth century and even before. Both of these schools assert that Dzogchen did not originate in Tibet itself, but had a Central Asian origin and was subsequently brought to Central Tibet by certain masters known as Mahasiddhas or great adepts. There thus would appear to exist two ancient and authentic lineages for the Dzogchen teachings, the Buddhist and the Bonpo.
But there exists a second type of religious culture also known as “Bon” whose adherents claim to represent the pre-Buddhist civilization of Tibet. These practitioners of Bon assert that at least part of their religious tradition was not native to Tibet, but was brought to Central Tibet sometime before the seventh century from the previously independent country of Zhang-zhung, west of Tibet, and more remotely from Tazik (stag-gzig) or Iranian speaking Central Asia to the northwest. [8] This form of Bon is known also as Yungdrung Bon (g.yung-drung bon), “the Eternal Teaching,” a term which could be reconstructed into Sanskrit as “Svastika-dharma,” where the swastika or sun-cross is the symbol of the eternal and the indestructable, corresponding in most every respect to the Buddhist term vajra or diamond (rdo-rje). In addition to ritual texts relating to shamanic and animistic practices, this ancient tradition possesses a large corpus of texts, also claiming to be pre-Buddhist in origin, relating to the higher teachings of Sutra, Tantra, and Dzogchen (mdo rgyud man-ngag gsum). The Bonpo Lamas, instead of looking back to the North Indian prince, Siddhartha Gautama, as their Buddha and as the source of their higher teachings of Sutra, Tantra, and Dzogchen, look back even further in time to another prince, Shenrab Miwoche (gShen-rab mi-bo-che), born in Olmo Lungring (‘Ol-mo lung-ring) in remote Central Asia, as their Buddha (sangs-rgyas) and as the source of their teachings.
Just as in the case of the Nyingmapas among the Tibetan Buddhists, the Bonpo tradition possesses as its highest teaching the system of contemplation known as Dzogchen, “the Great Perfection,” (rdogs-pa chen-po)…. Both the Buddhist Nyingmapas and the Bonpos assert that their respective Dzogchen traditions were brought to Central Tibet in the eighth century, the Nyingmapa transmission from the Mahasiddha Shrisimha in living in Northern India and the Bonpo transmission from a line of Mahasiddhas dwelling around Mount Kailas and the lake country of Zhang-zhung to the west and north of Tibet. Thus there appear to exist two different historically authentic lineages for the transmission of these teachings.
This seems equally true for the historical origins of Bonpo Dzogchen, for this second authentic lineage of the Dzogchen teachings also did not originate in India proper, but was brought to Central Tibet in the ninth and tenth centuries from Zhang-zhung in Northern Tibet by the disciples decending from Gyerpung Nangzher Lodpo. [39] Until the eighth century, the country of Zhang-zhung had been an independent kingdom with its own language and culture. It lay in what is now Western and Northern Tibet and the center of the country was dominated by the majestic presence of the sacred mountain of Gangchen Tise or Mount Kailas. Examining the available evidence, it now appears likely that before Indian Buddhism came to Central Tibet in the seventh and eighth centuries, Zhang-zhung had extensive contacts with the Buddhist cultures that flourished around it in Central Asia and in the Indo-Tibetan borderlands. Just to the west of Zhang-zhung there once existed the vast Kushana empire which was Buddhist in its religious culture. It was an area in which Indian Buddhism interacted with various strands of Iranian religion– Zoroastrian, Zurvanist, Mithraist, Manichean, as well as Indian Shaivism and Nestorian Christianity. This was also true of the oasis cities of the Silk Route to the northeast of Zhang-zhung such as Kashgar. Some scholars have seen this region beyond India as playing a key role in the development of certain aspects of Mahayana Buddhism, and later also in the development of Tantric form of Buddhism known as Vajrayana. [40] For example, the revelation of the Guhyasamaja Tantra is said to have occurred to king Indrabhuti in Uddiyana and was later brought to India proper by the Mahasiddhas Saraha and Nagarjuna. [41] Moreover, the Kalachakra Tantra is said to have been brought from Shambhala in Central Asia to Nalanda in India in the tenth century by the Mahasiddha Tsilupa. [42] The Bonpos came to identify this Shambhala with Olmo Lungring itself. [43] All this suggests that certain trends within Yungdrung Bon, rather than being later plagiarisms and imitations of Indian Buddhism concocted in the tenth century, actually do go back to a kind of syncretistic Indo-Iranian Buddhism that once flourished in the independent kingdom of Zhang-zhung before it was forcibly incorporated into the expanding Tibetan empire in the eighth century. This “Buddhism”, known as gyer in the Zhang-zhung language and as bon in the Tibetan, was not particularly monastic, but more Tantric in nature and its diffusion was stimulated by the presence of various Mahasiddhas in the region such as the illustrious Tapihritsa and his predecessors dwelling in caves about Mount Kailas and about the lakes to the east in Northern Tibet. Even into this century, Kailas remained an important site of pilgrimage drawing Hindu sadhus and yogis from India. [44]
Here is more from Stephen Batchelor highlighting several of the themes I’ve discussed here, from “Letting daylight into magic” at http://www.stephenbatchelor.org/daylight.html
Who are these invisible beings that appear to Tibetan lamas in dreams and visions, speak through oracles, predict the future, inspire awe and terror, bless those who worship them and incur misfortune on those who don’t? The Tibetan term for such beings is lha. Lha means “deity†or “god.†Such gods are both Indian and Tibetan in origin and constitute a pantheon as complex and arcane as that of ancient Greece and Rome. Yet with the advent of Mahayana and Vajrayana Buddhism, there appears an altogether different kind of god. These are buddhas and bodhisattvas, awakened beings who have vowed to work ceaselessly and in myriad ways for the welfare of beings. While not mere gods — who for all their powers are just another class of unawakened sentient being — they assume the form of gods (lha’i rnam par shar ba) for the benefit of others.
Tibetan Buddhists regard these gods, whether of the unawakened or awakened variety, as conscious, autonomous beings, every bit as real as you or I. The Dalai Lama, who so successfully presents Buddhism in the Western media as rational, pragmatic and compatible with modern psychology and science, appears to believe in the power of these gods. In a statement issued in English by the Tibetan government in exile in 1996, he is quoted from a speech to an audience of Tibetans as saying: “It has become fairly clear that Dolgyal (i.e. Shugden) is a spirit of the dark forces.â€
The Dalai Lama is not speaking here as a modern religious leader trying to persuade some of his superstitious flock to relinquish an outdated world view. He is engaged in an emotive debate about whether a particular god is a powerful but deluded sentient being or a buddha who has assumed the form of a god. Such is the perceived power of Dorje Shugden that both Gelukpas who invoke him and Nyingmapas who fear him are told not even to let his name pass their lips. This atmosphere of secrecy and implicit danger serves to affirm for Tibetan Buddhists their view of an invisible polytheistic reality intersecting with the human world.
Although this worldview may be unfamiliar, it is not intrinsically stranger than that of Christians and other religious believers who lack the exotic prestige Tibetan lamas have for Westerners. The main difference between it and other religious worldviews is that Buddhists know all these gods to be empty of any inherent reality. Everything, they would say, is merely an appearance as ephemeral and insubstantial as a dream. Such statements have led some in the West to assume that the gods of Tibetan Buddhism are no more than archetypal symbols: they perform a psychological function in the process of spiritual transformation, but only the naive would say they represent beings independent of the practitioner’s own mind. Yet however useful this kind of Jungian interpretation may be, it is not how most Tibetan lamas understand the world they inhabit.
For gods to be empty of inherent existence does not mean that they cannot be autonomous beings capable of making choices and existing in their own heavenly realms. In this sense they are no different from humans, who are likewise empty but perfectly capable of making decisions and living their own unique and fallible lives. The doctrine of emptiness only teaches us to see ourselves and the world in a way that frees us from the reification and egoism that generate anguish. To say the world is empty neither affirms nor denies the claims of any cosmological theory, be it that of ancient India or modern astrophysics.
To establish an authentic Buddhist state on the basis of this vision, however, requires ensuring that a correct view of emptiness be upheld by those in power. Such responsibility would be a necessary outcome of the bodhisattva’s compassionate resolve. For this reason, the Fifth Dalai Lama’s government proscribed the teachings of the Jonangpa school, who taught that emptiness implied a transcendent absolute reality which inherently exists (gzhan stong). Texts of the school were confiscated and its monasteries turned over to the Gelukpa. It seems other factions in the Geluk order would have liked to have taken similar measures against the Nyingma school.
In order to honor the historical heritage of Tibet, to affirm unity among the diverse communities of the Tibetan nation, even to be true to their own spiritual intuitions, one can understand why the Dalai Lamas would tolerate and even embrace Nyingma views. But however justified this might be in personal or political terms, it should not obscure the real and potentially divisive philosophical and doctrinal differences that exist between the Nyingma and Geluk ideologies.
The Nyingma teaching of Dzogchen regards awareness (rig pa) as the innate self-cognizant foundation of both samsara and nirvana. Rig pa is the intrinsic, uncontrived nature of mind, which a Dzogchen master is capable of directly pointing out to his students. For the Nyingmapa Dzogchen represents the very apogee of what the Buddha taught, whereas Tsongkhapa?s view of emptiness as just a negation (med ‘gag) of inherent existence, implying no transcendent reality, verges on nihilism.
For the Gelukpas, though, Dzogchen succumbs to the opposite extreme: that of delusively clinging to something permanent and self-existent as the basis of reality. They see Dzogchen as a return to the Hindu ideas that Buddhists resisted in India, and a residue of the Chan (Zen) doctrine of Hvashang Mahayana, proscribed at the time of the early kings. Moreover, some Kagyu and Nyingma teachers of the Rime (?Impartial?) revival movement in Eastern Tibet in the 19th century even began to promote a synthesis between the forbidden Jonangpa philosophy and the practice of Dzogchen.
For the followers of Shugden this is not an obscure metaphysical disagreement, but a life and death struggle for truth in which the destiny of all sentient beings is at stake. The bodhisattva vow, taken by every Tibetan Buddhist, is a commitment to lead all beings to the end of anguish and the realization of buddhahood. Following Tsongkhapa, the Gelukpas maintain that the only way to achieve this is to understand non-conceptually that nothing whatsoever inherently exists. Any residue, however subtle, of an attachment to inherent existence works against the bodhisattva’s aim and perpetuates the very anguish he or she seeks to dispel.
Moreover, protectors such as Dorje Shugden exert an enormous power over the minds of Tibetan Buddhists–be they erudite lamas, simple Bhutanese peasants or educated Westerners. While lamas teach that the taking of refuge in the Buddha, Dharma and Sangha is the only protection a Buddhist requires, they invariably supplement this with initiations into and practices of a range of protector gods. After all, the “Land of Snows†could be a harsh and frightening place. Tibetans lived in an awesome, sparsely inhabited landscape with a fierce climate, psychically populated by numerous spirits, demons and gods. The very survival of communities required a powerful sense of family, tribal and religious loyalty. In a modern, psychological sense, Dorje Shugden could be seen as the personification of a specific set of fears and loyalties in the form of a god. But for Tibetan Buddhists he is not just a metaphor; he is a real, living god/buddha whose displeasure can wreak havoc on human beings.
Edward: “Now I could be wrong. And I could be less developed in meditative sciences than Andy. And Dzogchen and tantra in general could be right about it being a “higher†vehicle surpassing the rangtong. But I have strong doubts still due to the shamanistic roots of tantra in India and Tibet, with such roots positing a dualistic “spirit†realm opposed to the mundane. Notice above how even an “advanced†nondual experience is still tainted by the “innate afflictive obstructions†of animals and babies! We are inherently defiled and only the special, magical powers of such traditions can “save†us. Maybe.”
Now I am confused. Earlier you seemed to be discussing two ways of meditating, and that is what I responded to. Misinformed as I say it is, it is a very common view, I have seen many people, including Wilber, present it. So I’m certainly not surprised to see it discussed here.
But now you seem to be discussing the possibility of an intermediate spirit realm, gods who are ultimately unreal, but as relatively real as human beings are. I don’t see that the two ideas necessarily have any connection. One could believe in the existence (though not inherent according to your sources) of these gods or spirits, and still maintain that there is only one kind of meditation. Or one could deny the existence of such spirits, and insist that there are two (or more kinds of meditation).
So unless you shifted the subject without my being aware of it, I don’t see the relevance of this spirit world to what you were discussing earlier.
Wrt the kinds of meditation, I think Gurdjieff is an example of a fairly well known mystic who to my knowledge/recollection did not distinguish different forms of meditation. He simply referred to the awakening process as self-observation. A very good term I think, because it does not imply a particular bias towards the inner or the outer. Observation of one’s thoughts would be inner, and what is very commonly considered to be meditation. But observation of one’s physical behavior necessarily involves some awareness of the outer world that that behavior interacts with. And of course his teaching heavily emphasized activities in this world.
So self-observation can encompass all the various processes that I say are associated with awakening: stopping/being aware of/transcending thought; relaxing the body; being aware of oneself; being aware of one’s surroundings. It has the further advantage of being couched in terms that encourage its being understood as going on all the time, in all sorts of activities, rather than something done only when one is sitting quietly. Though I still prefer the description stopping thought–because I think that is easier for people to understand, it gives them something obvious to focus on–that does suggest an in inward bias that tends to interfere with the routines of life.
Andy,
There are several themes going on here. Prior to the different types of meditation discussion I brought in the magical basis of Dzogchen through Bon (see above). Dzogchen is a mixture of Buddhism, Bon and magical rituals, and I contend that the latter could very well affect how Dzogchen even formulates “mind,” “no mind” and mediation technique. As you noted yourself, in the reference to the Kalachakra Tantra he goes into detailed and seemingly endless and superflous detail about the “real” nondual and how to attain it. And I contend that it might be “infected” with the magical dualistic worldview of pre-Buddhist shamanism. Hence my foray into the history of Bon and Batchelor’s comments on the residual magical belief in “real” deities in Vajrayana.
From The Rhetoric of Immediacy: A Cultural Critique of Chan/Zen Buddhism by Bernard Faure, pp. 105-6:
The same point is made by Andrew Rawlinson, who argues that “magic pervades Buddhist cosmology and is not peripheral to itâ€â€¦.Thus the supernatural elements in Buddhism cannot be regarded as “fringe benefits adding color and flavour to a great religion.†They belong, and have always belonged, pace Pachow and other advocates of “pure Buddhism,†to the “fundamentals†of Buddhism.
The word “abhijnaâ€* was usually translated in Chinese as “shentong,†[meaning] spiritual penetration.
…the main reason for the acceptance of Buddhism by the Chinese apparently had…more to do with the supernatural powers supposedly brought by the practice of Buddhist meditation. Many texts bear witness to the fact that meditation was primarily a means of obtaining shentong.
*abhijna – In Buddhist philosophy, the miraculous powers obtained through meditation and wisdom. They include the ability to travel any distance or take any form at will, to see everything, to hear everything, to read minds, and to recall former existences. A sixth miraculous power, available only to Buddhas and arhats (saints), is freedom by undefiled wisdom (Enlightenment). The powers are signs of spiritual progress but their indulgence is a distraction from the path toward Enlightenment. (concise.britannica.com)